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This commentary addresses issues raised by Professors Areeda and Turner
in Williamson on Predatory Pricing, which was published in the June
1978 issue of this Journal.1 Areeda and Turner took exception with my
earlier treatment of predatory pricing,2 in which I emphasized its strategic
aspects.a They defended their previous treatment, 4 in which strategic aspects
are ignored or suppressed. Although modeling strategic problems in non-
strategic terms can be illuminating, in that it sometimes helps to place
strategic features in perspective, I contend that public policy with respect
to strategic behavior ought to be informed by strategic analysis. Areeda
and Turner evidently hold otherwise.
Inasmuch as this commentary mainly deals with differences between
myself and Areeda and Turner, I should like to emphasize at the outset
that we agree on the following: (1) predatory pricing is not an empty con-
cern; (2) a major hazard in allowing private predatory pricing actions to be
brought is that they will be used for protectionist purposes; and (3) a
principal means of safeguarding against protectionist abuses of the law is
to devise predatory pricing rules that have good economic efficiency prop-
erties. But although protectionist abuses of predatory pricing actions by
new entrants can be serious, strategic abuses by established firms also re-
quire attention. Indeed, a complete efficiency analysis is not possible until
potential abuses of this latter kind are taken into account.
Section I examines strategic versus nonstrategic approaches to predatory
pricing. Section II deals with mistaken welfare arguments on which Areeda
and Turner continue to rely. Potentially misleading statements in their
comment are considered in section III. Section IV addresses purported
operationality problems that they attribute to my output restraining rule
and also discusses previously unremarked operationality difficulties endemic
t Charles and William L. Day Professor of Economics and Social Science, University
of Pennsylvania. Early drafts of this paper were prepared while I was a Fellow at the
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1. Areeda & Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978).
2. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284
(1977).
3. Id. at 286-306.
4. Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1975).
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to cost-based rules. Finally, section V contains a discussion of fairness issues,
the decision-theoretic character of predatory pricing, and complications that
arise when differentiated products are involved.
I. Strategic Behavior
The problems with the Areeda and Turner treatment start, as it were, at
the beginning. As Professor Posner observes, Areeda and Turner are curi-
ously silent on possible motivations for predatory pricing: "no theory of
why predatory pricing would ever occur is suggested."5 Areeda and Turner
simply omit this crucial step and assert that
[a] firm which drives out or excludes rivals by selling at unremunera-
tive prices is not competing on the merits, but engaging in behavior
that may properly be called predatory. There is, therefore, good reason
for including a "predatory pricing" antitrust offense within the pro-
scription of monopolization or attempts to monopolize in section 2 of
the Sherman Act. 6
Bypassing motivational issues in this way would be unobjectionable if it
were true that the economic efficiency properties of rules of law for govern-
ing predatory pricing could be ascertained without reference to the con-
text. Whether Areeda and Turner believe this to be the case is never ex-
pressly discussed. Presumably they do, however, since they continue to ap-
peal to static economic arguments in claiming optimality properties for
their marginal cost pricing rules as though static analysis applied without
regard for the circumstances.7
Not only is this incorrect, but, as Professor Bork has shown,8 predatory
pricing lacks rationality, hence is of doubtful public policy significance,
when assessed in static terms. Bork demonstrates this point by considering a
firm with an 80 percent market share that "wishes to kill a rival with 20
percent in order to achieve the comforts and prerogatives of monopoly
status."9 He concludes, I think correctly, that "[t]he [static] theoretical argu-
ment presented here suggests that predatory price cutting is most unlikely
to exist."' 0
Confronted with the inconsistency between their claim that predatory
pricing is a relevant antitrust concern and the logic of Bork's analysis,
Areeda and Turner have four choices. First, they could show that Bork has
erred and that predatory pricing really does pose troublesome antitrust
concerns when addressed as a problem in static economic analysis. Second,
they could join Bork and reverse their claim that predatory pricing has
public policy significance. Third, they could associate themselves with the
5. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis (forthcoming 127 U. PA. L. Rzv.
(1979)).
6. Areeda & Turner, supra note 4, at 697.
7. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1338-45.
8. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 149-55 (1978).
9. Id. at 149.
10. Id. at 155.
1184
Vol. 88: 1183, 1979
Predatory Pricing
emerging view that predatory pricing needs to be examined as an inter-
temporal issue. Fourth, they could do none of the above and ignore the
embarrassing logic to which static analysis leads.
Although Areeda and Turner adopt the last of these,"' others are apt to
regard this as untenable. Those who hold that Bork's analysis is correct,
that predatory pricing is a relevant antitrust issue, and that inconsistency is
unacceptable are driven to position three. Specifically, I contend that focus-
ing, as Bork does, exclusively on the case in which a dominant firm sets out
to destroy a rival that has already committed itself by investing in specialized
human and physical capital (and therefore needs only to recover its vari-
able costs to remain viable during a predatory siege) fails to disclose the
full ramifications of predatory pricing. The necessary distinction is be-
tween immediate and eventual effects. Bludgeoning established rivals is
relatively unrewarding if there are no subsequent consequences. I submit,
however, that the dominant firm that responds contingently to new compe-
tition by expanding output disproportionately whenever such rivalry ap-
pears will frequently be less concerned with the demise of a specific rival in
a particular product market than with signaling its intentions to this and
other firms in future periods, in other geographic areas, and, possibly, in
related product lines. Successful signaling of a probable punitive response
can permit a dominant firm to enjoy greater profits (or an easier life) by
reducing the likelihood that its markets will be subject to encroachment.
Most antitrust specialists, Areeda and Turner included, are unwilling to
regard predatory pricing as a vacuous issue, presumably because they are
aware, at least intuitively, 9f its strategic features. "Strategic" refers to in-
tertemporal efforts by established firms to take up advance positions and
respond contingently to rivalry in ways that either discipline existing rivals,
or discourage potential competition, or both. But more than intuitive aware-
ness is required. Static analysis must give way to intertemporal analysis
when the strategic nature of predatory pricing is apparent.
Recent contributions to the study of predatory pricing not only draw the
distinction between static and strategic analysis, but indicate a growing
recognition that the critical issues are of the strategic kind. Thus Professor
Baumol observes that the static analysis upon which Areeda and Turner
rely is "inadequate ... because it draws our attention from the most press-
ing issues that are involved."' 2 And Baumol also remarks that "Williamson
has identified the nub of the problem in his emphasis on the inter-temporal
side of the matter."13 Likewise Posner insists that strategic behavior is cen-
11. Although early in their article Areeda and Turner concede that "predation in any
meaningful sense cannot exist unless there is a . . . very substantial prospect that the
losses [incurred by the predator] in the predatory campaign will be exceeded by tile
profits to be earned after his rivals have been destroyed," Areeda & Turner, supra note
4, at 698, the lack of correspondence between this statement and their subsequent analysis
is striking. Intertemporal considerations effectively vanish. Areeda and Turner rely en-
tirely on static economic theory to conduct their analysis and support efficiency claims on
behalf of their proposed rules of law.
12. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions-A Policy for Prevention of "Pred-
atory Pricing" 2-3 (Apr. 1978) (unpublished manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal).
13. Id. at 3-4.
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tral to an understanding of predatory pricing and notes that Areeda and
Turner rely on "pure textbook price theory unadorned by any of the
[strategic behavior] concepts of industrial organization."' 4  Professor
Scherer's original critique of Areeda and Turner also featured strategic
objections.' 5
This reorientation of predatory pricing to make express allowance for
its strategic features will, I submit, continue. Indeed, there is increasing
awareness that the types and extent of strategic behavior, of which preda-
tory pricing is one manifestation, are more widespread than has hitherto
been appreciated. 1 Areeda and Turner's use of static rules to deal with
an intertemporal problem has resulted in an egregious mismatch. Public
policy is well advised both to recognize the contradiction and reject their
marginal cost pricing rules as a basis for governing predatory pricing.
II. Mistaken Welfare Arguments by Areeda and Turner
Marginal cost pricing in static, nonstrategic, competitively organized
markets is commonly described as "the competitive result" to which "op-
timal" efficiency properties are ascribed. To the extent, however, that these
idealized conditions are not satisfied, the applicability of these same claims
is not obvious. If, as I contend, predatory pricing typically arises in cir-
cumstances in which intertemporal, strategic, monopolistic attributes are
prominent, a striking lack of correspondence exists between the problem
under investigation and the textbook assumptions on which short-run
marginal cost pricing arguments are based. The principal error of the
original Areeda-Turner contribution, which they repeat in their comment,
is that they are prepared to invoke the optimality properties of short-run
marginal cost pricing without regard to the circumstances.
Rather than acknowledging and attempting to grapple with the fact that,
evaluated in standard welfare economics terms, my output restraining rule
dominates their marginal cost pricing rule in both pre-entry and post-entiy
welfare respects,'7 Areeda and Turner instead invent a new welfare cal-
14. Posner, supra note 5.
15. Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARV. L. REV.
869 (1976).
16. My confidence here is partly based on the widespread interest in the study of
strategic behavior that has been developing. In addition to the sources cited in notes 2,
5, 12 & 15 supra, see Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence (forthcoming 69 Am. EcoN. REV.
(1979)); Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The Realemon Case
(forthcoming 127 U. PA. L. REV. (1979)); Spence, Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligop-
olistic Pricing, 8 BELL J. ECON. 535 (1977); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restric-
tions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach (forthcoming 127 U. PA.
L. REV. (1979)).
17. The welfare economics defects of the original Areeda and Turner contribution,
which remain uncorrected by their more recent comment, are the following:
1. They confuse the optimality properties associated with marginal cost pricing of
a continuing kind with that which is episodic or, even worse, strategic. See William-
son, supra note 2, at 289-92.
2. Ex ante welfare losses of the following kinds result from relying upon their rules:
(a) holding technology constant, dominant firms will predictably supply less
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culus. The relevant tradeoff, as they would have it, is between maximizing
pre-entry output and minimizing the incentive for entry on an inefficient
scale. Specifically, they claim that choice among predatory pricing rules
depends on the pre-entry output decisions of dominant firms on the one
hand and "the likelihood of inefficient entry"' 8 on the other-where in-
efficient entry is evidently measured by the extent to which the entrant's
costs exceed minimum average cost.
The grounds upon which the relevant tradeoff is expressed in these terms
are never disclosed. I submit that the burden of supporting such ad hoc
welfare apparatus rests heavily on those who propose it.19 Absent such a
showing, there is little basis for presuming that the issues will be illumi-
nated by reference to nonstandard welfare criteria-and considerable risk
that obfuscation will result.20
product in the pre-entry period and produce it at higher average cost under
their rules than mine;
(b) dominant firm investment incentives are distorted to favor more flexible and
more capital intensive plant at great social cost under their rules than mine.
See id. at 307-09, 312-14.
3. Ex post inefficiencies of the following kinds will result from their rules as com-
pared with mine:
(a) the costs of supplying post-entry product will be higher under their rules
than mine;
(b) entrants are faced with greater uncertainty under their rules than mine;
(c) prospectively viable entrants are less able to establish their credentials under
their rules than mine.
See id. at 309-10, 312, 335-36.
18. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1342.
19. Inasmuch as output is not valued for its own sake but only in relation to net wel-
fare gains, the first part of the test is obscure. Also "inefficient entry" is undefined, and
Areeda and Turner may be confusing engineering with economic efficiency. The relevant
distinction is this: even though an entrant may not be realizing minimum efficient scale
(an engineering efficiency concept), remunerative incremental output that is supplied by
a (possibly high-cost) entering firm that a low-cost established firm had declined to
supply increases allocative efficiency (the economic efficiency criterion).
To be sure, society would have been better off if the incremental output referred to
had been supplied by a lower-cost firm. But hypothetical output that could have been,
but was not, supplied by a low-cost dominant firm is not output to which welfare
benefits can be ascribed.
Moreover, entry by firms of size less than minimum efficient scale may occur under
both their cost-based rule and my output restraining rule. Indeed, for the main model
that I developed in my original article, the degree to which entering firms fall short of
minimum efficient scale is identical for each of the predatory pricing rules that I
evaluate. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 297-302. Except as it is more difficult for
prospective entrants and/or courts to infer the response curve of dominant firms that are
governed by one predatory pricing rule rather than another (e.g., a marginal cost response
curve is more difficult to estimate than an output restraint), the equilibrium probability
of entry is presumably affected little by which predatory pricing rule is in effect. Thus,
except transitionally (when one rule or the other is first introduced), the "likelihood of
inefficient entry" criterion to which Areeda and Turner appeal is unhelpful for welfare-
assessment purposes.
20. Areeda and Turner's introduction of a price-maintenance rule into their rule
comparison exercise does not clarify their analysis. They neither endorse such a rule nor
display the welfare benefits that would result from it-presumably because the rule is so
egregiously inefficient in post-entry respects. Under the rule, established firms would be
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III. Conceptual Issues
A. Misleading Statements and Claims
The Areeda-Turner comment includes several potentially misleading
statements and claims. Among those which I find most troublesome are the
following:
1. Areeda and Turner state that I agree with their views that "pricing at
SRMC [short-run marginal cost] is the result in competitive markets, and
has the social welfare virtue of avoiding wasteful idling of current produc-
tive resources" and that "rules requiring price floors higher than SRMC
will tend to preserve inefficient rivals or attract inefficient entry."' This
is a tortured interpretation of my position. I expressly caution against un-
critical application of short-run marginal cost propositions to circumstances,
of which predatory pricing is one, in which strategic considerations are
salient. I demonstrate the inferior welfare properties of this rule as com-
pared with the output restraining rule in the context of predatory pricing.
I also reject SRMC in favor of average variable and average total cost floors
in circumstances in which price-to-cost comparisons are attempted. A dis-
cerning reader might detect in a footnote that I find contingent marginal
cost pricing objectionable,2 2 but my emphatic rejection of the optimality
claims which Areeda and Turner advance on behalf of episodic or con-
tingent marginal cost pricing is scarcely evident from their comment.
2. Areeda and Turner argue the optimality properties of their rule in
marginal cost terms. However, they effectively abandon marginal cost in
favor of an average variable cost "surrogate" when applications are con-
cerned. At times they talk about "A VC (or MC)" and "MC (or A VC) ''23 as
though these were interchangeable. When theory gives way to practice, a
check on whether purported optimality properties carry over is warranted 24-
even in circumstances such as this in which the original theory is incomplete.
3. Areeda and Turner observe that I prefer an average total cost
remunerative-pricing test rather than an average variable cost test because
a firm "with a less capital intensive technology may have higher variable
costs but lower average costs,"2 5 in which event the A VC test would not
correctly discriminate between firms according to efficiency. But they con-
required to idle their capacity since they would have to withdraw product in an amount
identical to the output brought onto the market by the entrant in order to keep the
price unchanged. See id. at 316-18, 328 (demonstration in "generational equipment"
example of asset-waste consequences of price-maintenance rule). Moreover, those who take
the suggestion of a price-maintenance rule at all seriously must go on to consider the
following possibility: why not induce even greater pre-entry output, which is the benefit
that Areeda and Turner ascribe to the price-maintenance rule, by requiring dominant
firms to increase price when confronted by entry? So far as I can determine, the price-
maintenance rule is at best an irrelevant alternative.
21. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1339.
22. Id. at 1339 n.10.
23. Id. at 1350-51.
24. Professor Posner makes a similar observation. See Posner, supra note 5.
The lack of correspondence between average variable costs and marginal costs is dis-
cussed further at p. 1196 infra.
25. Areeda & Turner, suPra note 1, at 1351.
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tend that "[t]his possibility cannot carry the weight Williamson puts on it.
The instance he cites involves the unusual case of competition among al-
ternative transportation modes, such as railroads and trucks. And he him-
self observed that 'these problems [the differing technology case] may occur
infrequently.' "26
The problem with this contention is that although I expressly concede
that the technology differences between rail and truck are unusual, Areeda
and Turner cite the transportation mode example out of context. Had I
thought it necessary to support what seemed to me to be the plausible
proposition that capital intensity differences may often complicate problems
of inferring efficiency by reference to average variable costs, I would have
offered examples of the following kinds: average variable cost differences
that are attributable to capital intensity differences between large and
small bituminous coal mining companies;2 7 or capital intensity differences
associated with the use of different fuels in generating electric power.2 8
Another general situation-which may or may not involve capital in-
tensity differences-in which the average variable cost test encounters dif-
ficulties occurs when firms differ in degree of vertical integration. Consider
two firms, A and B, that sell a common product at a price of $1.00. Manu-
facturing is in two stages: the first involves production of the basic ma-
terial (M); this material is then processed to yield the final good (G).
Firm A makes its own M at an average total cost of $.60, of which $.40 is a
capital charge. Firm B buys M for $.60 from other suppliers. The costs of
processing Al to produce G are $.35 for firm A and $.30 for firm B, the
respective capital charges being $.20 and 5.15. The overall costs for A and
B, expressed in average variable and average total cost terms, are:
AVC ATC
firm A .35 .95
firm B .75 .90
To be sure, this is a hypothetical example. But it both points up the ease
with which the differences to which I refer can arise and discloses that
strategic incentives for integration may exist if, contrary to Areeda and
Turner, prices are not required to cover all costs in the long run.
B. Other Conceptual Issues
1. Areeda and Turner appear to take issue with my assumption that
dominant firms engage in limit pricing. They observe that "limit pricing
would probably make sense only where the dominant firm has a significant
and relatively durable cost or product advantage over any potential en-
trants, or where there are significant economies of scale."29 But since I
26. Id. (quoting Williamson, supra note 2, at 289 n.20).
27. See Williamson, Wage Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in
Perspective, 82 Q.J. EcoN. 85 (1968).
28. Griffin, Long-Run Production Modeling with Pseudo-Data: Electric Power Genera-
lion, 8 BELL. J. EcoN. 112, 120-23 (1977).
29. Areeda & Turner, suPra note 1, at 1343 (footnote omittegl).
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defined a dominant firm industry as one where entry is not easy, and since
significant, though not massive, economies of scale were featured in my
model of the dominant firm industry, I am unable to discover what pur-
pose is served by their remarks. I will concede, however, if there was any
confusion of the matter, that firms will rarely set price below the short-run
profit-maximizing price in circumstances where entry is easy.
Given that I will stipulate that the relevant subset is industries in which
entry is difficult, the question is how to interpret dominant firm behavior
in these industries. Areeda and Turner's observation that limit pricing in-
volves a tradeoff between current and future profits, where the latter are
uncertain and need to be discounted, 30 is correct as far as it goes. 31 But it
only scratches the surface.
There are two core issues: First, in what ways, if any, can rules of law
be translated into entry barrier effects? Second, if entry can be deterred,
what is to be inferred if dominant firms behave in a manner consistent
with an entry deterring objective? I demonstrated that, as compared with
a rule of law where output is restrained, rules of law that allow dominant
firms to expand output in response to entry permit such firms to impede
entry more effectively, ceteris paribus. Although Areeda and Turner orig-
inally disclosed no awareness that ex post responses could affect the ex
ante condition of entry, they evidently concede the relation now.
The remaining question is what is to be inferred from dominant firm
decisions to increase output disproportionately, as the Areeda-Turner rules
permit, when confronted with entry. Although it is possible that dominant
firms would increase output in these circumstances without regard to the
strategic advantage thereby realized, most antitrust specialists impute
rudimentary powers of analysis to dominant firms and would be unwilling
to accept mindlessness as an explanation for behavior that systematically
serves strategic purposes. Absent a plausible alternative explanation-the
burden of which rests on Areeda and Turner who, throughout their ex-
tensive commentary on predatory pricing,3 2 have nowhere disclosed what
it is that motivates dominant firms systematically to increase output when
confronted with entry-it seems judicious to infer that behavior that pro-
motes strategic purposes is intended to achieve that very result.
2. Areeda and Turner contend that dominant firms will be confronted
with "perverse" output limitations of extended duration if Firm A enters
a market at one time and Firm B enters twelve to eighteen months later,
when the restraint on the dominant firm is about to expire.33 Three points
should be recognized, however. First, the dominant firm is restrained only
30. Id. at 1343-44.
31. I have addressed the issue of maximizing expected, discounted profits in the
context of an entry model previously, see Williamson, Selling Expense as a Barrier to
Entry, 77 Q.J. EcoN. 112, 125-26 (1963), and made reference both to that discussion and
to the probabilistic nature of the limit pricing tradeoff relation in my original predatory,
pricing article, see Williamson, supra note 2, at 294 n.33.
32. 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 711-722 (1978); Areeda 8- Turner,
supra note 1; Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1976);
Areeda & Turner, supra note 4.
33. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1349-50.
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within markets where there has been entry. Second, even within these, the
dominant firm is permitted to expand in a trend-adjusted fashion through-
out the entire restraint interval. Finally, successive entry by independent
rivals into the same market is rather unlikely if the dominant firm is ex-
panding up to the limit of its trend-adjusted restraint while at the same
time the recent entrant is attempting to secure a viable place for itself in
the industry. Here as elsewhere, hypotheticals such as this one, which are
not operationally interesting, have little significance for the main argu-
ment.
3. Areeda and Turner contend that a twelve- to eighteen-month restraint
period is of little consequence, since the dominant firm could at the ex-
piration of the period "drive out any new entrant who had come in at an
inefficiently small scale, even though the entrant had by then overcome
'learning curve' and other start-up disadvantages."34 I disagree.
For one thing, the fact that the experienced entrant has overcome start-
up disadvantages makes displacement more difficult-a condition that will
not be lost in the dominant firm's calculus. But there is more to it than
this. Buyers have an interest in maintaining competitive sources of supply-
as discussion with any purchasing agent will disclose. Although buyers may
be reluctant to engage in contracting with potential entrants,3 5 the same
does not apply to established entrants that have incurred the fixed costs
of entry and also have a demonstrated track record.
It is therefore apparent that the costs of driving out new entrants shift
to the disadvantage of the dominant firm by the time the restraint period
expires. The negligible consequences to which Areeda and Turner refer do
not stand up to scrutiny.
IV. Operationality
Areeda and Turner contend that there are serious operationality prob-
lems with the output restraining rule. I submit that these are overstated
and that operationality problems with cost-based rules are more severe.
A. Geographic Markets
I have argued that the output rule would be especially easy to apply for
products that are sold in many geographic markets, since the question of
whether output has been increased disproportionately in response to entry
will be easier to ascertain if entry occurs in only one or a few such
markets. Areeda and Turner claim otherwise, arguing that the complexities
of defining geographical markets constitute a formidable bar to such an
exercise.3 0 I agree that the definition of geographic markets can be dif-
ficult, but some of the difficulties to which Areeda and Turner refer may
be explained by their unstated but implicit assumption that economically
meaningful geographic submarkets need to be carefully defined through-
34. Id. at 1345.
35. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 295 n.37.
36. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1346-47.
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out the region where entry occurs. Frequently, however, such detail will not
be necessary.
As Professor Schmalensee has argued, it would be a mistake to apply the
same market definition standards that characterize enforcement of the
merger statutes to predatory pricing litigation.3 7 What is needed for the
latter is merely to establish that (1) a dominant firm enjoys monopoly
power in the general region of which a particular submarket is a part and
(2) attempted entry into a submarket is met with a disproportionate output
response.
The preoccupation with geographic market definitions to which Areeda
and Turner refer is thus supplanted by a study of markets from a marketing
point of view. As between similar submarkets served by a dominant firm,
some of which have been subject to entry but most of which have not, the
critical issue is whether output has been increased disproportionately in
the former.38
B. Demand Projections
Areeda and Turner also contend that demand projections pose formi-
dable problems:
The period for computing the trended average is unspecified, and the
problem has no easy solution. It seems virtually certain that any fixed
period, covering the wide variety of product markets, would be wrong
most of the time and in some instances would yield wildly implausible
results. Yet to leave the appropriate trend-averaging period up to a
case-by-case determination would virtually destroy predictability and
would encourage litigation.3 9
They are correct that I did not specify the period. Neither did I specify
the weights. Rather than resolve this uniformly, in the service of pre-
dictability, I suggest that the data be permitted to speak for themselves.
Thus, for example, sales could be projected on the basis of an exponentially
weighted moving average,40 the weights inferred from all recent data. The
37. See Schmalensee, supra note 16.
38. Thus, suppose that a dominant firm is selling to 50 cities of 200,000 population
or greater and that a new competitor has entered the market in three of these cities. The
dominant firm increases output relative to trend by 8-13% in each of the three cities,
whereas the maximum output increase relative to trend elsewhere was 4%. I submit that
a presumption that the dominant firm is responding selectively and punitively is war-
ranted.
39. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1347.
40. For discussion of a rather primitive kind of sales forecasting, see C. HOLT, F.
MODIGLIANI, J. MUTH & H. SIMON, PLANNING PRODUCTION, INVENTORIES, AND WORK FORCE
131-52, 258-71 (1960). For an examination of the statistical properties of exponentially
weighted forecasts, see Muth, Optimal Properties of Exponentially lVeighlted Forecasts, 55
J. Ams. STATISTICAL A. 299 (1960). For a less technical discussion, see J. ARMISTRONG, LONG-
RANGE FORECASTING (1978).
In my original predatory pricing article, I suggested that a 10% allowance over the
projection might be warranted in judging whether a dominant firm has responded dis-
proportionately. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 305-06. This is overly generous if
demand projections can be made with confidence. More generally, allowances should
vary with the degree of forecast error.
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"effective" length of the period thus will vary across products and across
markets-with distant observations being assigned negligible weights for
some products and markets and greater weights for others, depending on
what the data disclose. Areeda and Turner's insistence that such issues
be settled in advance is arbitrary and unwarranted; not only is a case-by-
case determination appropriate, but such demand projections pose many
fewer difficulties than the case-by-case estimation of marginal costs or
surrogates thereof upon which the Areeda-Turner tests rely.
Note, moreover, that a secondary output test is sometimes feasible for
dominant firms that have defeated an entry attempt by increasing output
disproportionately in targeted markets. Is output thereafter cut back to
trend-adjusted levels or does it remain in the higher range? Deviations from
trend, the origin and termination of which are coterminous with unsuc-
cessful entry efforts, emphatically suggest a pernicious purpose.4 1
C. Presumptions
Areeda and Turner contend that my approach to predatory pricing in-
volves "heavy reliance on cost-based rules" 42 and that "most real-world
claims of predatory pricing can sensibly be analyzed only by comparing the
price to the costs of the alleged predator."43 I point out in this connection
that (1) the distinction between predatory pricing by dominant firms against
new entrants and predatory pricing among established firms is basic; (2)
dominant firms enjoy the presumption of behaving lawfully if output is not
increased disproportionately in response to entry; (3) the qualification that
price should exceed average variable cost when trend-adjusted output is
held unchanged by a dominant firm allows for remote contingencies and is
normally of slight operational importance;44 (4) the predatory pricing rules
that apply to established firms are indeed cost-based and suffer all the
disabilities that such tests are subject to, but the cost-based rules that I
recommend are never of a marginal cost kind and are identical to Areeda
and Turner's only for the declining industry case.
Note in this last connection that Areeda and Turner regard it as a merit
of their rules that they "make no distinction between 'intermediate' and
'long' run or between 'normal' demand conditions and those of 'chronic
excess supply,' nor between 'early stage growth industries' and others." 45
The source of their pride is not altogether clear. If they are saying the
world is not complicated by these factors then I say fine, some of my rules
are redundant-in that they apply to circumstances that will never occur.
If instead they concede that such complications are real, then the test of
41. As discussed at p. 1185 sulpra, however, it is not necessary that a rival be
destroed in order for the purposes of a contingent output strategy to be realized. The
primary test for predatory behavior thus remains the same: is output increased dispro-
portionately when an entrant appears?
42. Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1352.
43. Id. at 1338.
44. See Williamson, sutra note 2, at 297 nA0, 332-33 & nn.119-20. I have, however,
encountered one instance in which the derived demand for a product was almost totally
inelastic, so that the ealuation of post-entry behavior turned mainly on an examination
of costs.
45. Areeda & Turner, supra note I, at 1352.
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whether prices are remunerative varies with the circumstances. Since there
is no indication that my rules are mistaken in this respect, their objection
to matching rules with circumstances apparently reduces to one of ad-
ministration: a uniform cost standard is all that the courts can handle. I
seriously doubt this. If true, however, cost-based rules are even more
problematical.- 6 Whether predatory pricing among established firms will
ultimately have to be ignored for this reason-and attention restricted in-
stead to the dominant firm-new entry case, where the main test is whether
output has been expanded disproportionately-is uncertain.
D. Definitions
1. Oligopoly
As Areeda and Turner observe, my output rule is restricted to dominant
firms and collusive oligopolies. They complain, however, that collusive
oligopoly is undefined and that the policy is not easily administered in this
instance. 47 The latter observation is correct. As for a definition of collusive
oligopoly, I observe in my original article that collusive oligopoly is not
nearly so widespread a condition as is frequently alleged. It "occurs mainly
in mature, highly concentrated industries producing homogeneous products
under uniform cost conditions and having significant barriers to entry. '48 I
further referred the reader to an elaboration of the argument should he be
interested.4 9
Now possibly Areeda and Turner believe that every paper should be
self-contained and that, accordingly, I should define "mature," "highly
concentrated," "homogeneous," "uniform cost," and "significant barriers."
I think this an unreasonable expectation. There is a significant literature
that deals with these matters, which most antitrust specialists are familiar
with.50 Lest, however, there be any doubts as to what I consider "highly
concentrated," I should make clear that my standard is more severe than
what Professor Turner, in collaboration with Professor Carl Kaysen, once
described as "tight" oligopoly-namely, a market in which eight or fewer
firms supply fifty percent of the market and the largest firm has a twenty
percent or higher share.5 1 Rather, the Neal Committee Report, which
characterized highly concentrated industries as those in which four or fewer
firms account for more than seventy percent of the output, seems to me
much closer to the mark.52
46. Professor Bork's rejection of the Areeda-Turner approach appeals to turn partly
on the administrative problems that arise in conjunction with their cost-based rules. See
R. BORK, supra note 8, at 154.
47. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 1, at 1348.
48. Williamson, supra note 2, at 293.
49. Id. at 293 nn.29 & 30.
50. Professor Scherer's text is highly recommended. See F. SCHERrR, INDUSTRIAL MARKLT
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1970).
51. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 72 (1959).
52. White House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy (1969), reprinted in 2 ANTI-
TRUST L. & ECON. REV., Winter 1968-69, at 11.
Also, George Stigler observes that his data show "'no relation between profitabilit) and
concentration if ... the share of the four largest firms is less than about 80 percent." G.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 58 (1968).
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Areeda and Turner are correct, however, in their contention that, even
when four-firm concentration ratios reach seventy percent, problems will
arise in administering an output rule against predatory pricing in oligop-
olies. First, ascertaining whether a local response should be regarded as
punitive is more difficult for a collusive oligopoly than in a dominant firm
industry-though for "first pass" purposes one could maintain the same
standard as for dominant firms and simply look at the aggregate response
of the largest firms in markets in which entry has occurred.5a More serious
is the possibility that administering an output restraint during the im-
mediate post-entry period will be difficult and could have the unwanted
side effect of reinforcing collusion. I should have acknowledged these
difficulties in my original discussion. I am grateful to Areeda and Turner
for pointing them out.
2. Dominant Firms and Entry
I defined a dominant firm industry as one in which "the largest firm has
a market share of at least sixty percent and entry into the market is not
easy."5 Areeda and Turner object that the sixty percent test is much "too
inclusive" and claim that my reference to the condition of entry is "hope-
lessly vague."55 As to the first, I point out that Kaysen and Turner define a
"dominant firm" or "partial monopoly" as "a single large firm supplying
sixty percent or more of the market, with no other single seller supplying a
significant proportion of demand." 56 But for their reference to other single
sellers, which I agree is a useful qualification and am prepared to add, my
market share standard is identical to theirs. Others have described dominant
firms in similar terms.57 Should Areeda or Turner, individually or in com-
bination, propose an alternative standard, however, I am confident that it
will receive careful consideration.
Defining the condition of entry more completely would entail a major
digression, and there exists a substantial consensus within the profession as
to what factors contribute to a barrier to entry.58 The recent Areeda and
Turner treatise discusses several of these factors-without, however, quanti-
fying them.59 Despite this lack of specificity, they conclude their discussion
of entry barriers with the observation that, "[t]here are indeed barriers to
entry of various sorts that may protect the exercise of market power by
53. There may be special oligopoly cases in which the policing response is assigned to
the largest firm. Suppose that the four largest firms occupy 80% of the market and that
there are four regional markets within each of which a different member of the four has
a 50% market share. A tacit understanding that entry will be resisted in each regional
market by the firm which has the largest share in that market might emerge. If this were
the case, the "oligopoly problems" referred to in the text would vanish. The opera-
tional importance of this hypothetical, however, is limited by its very special nature.
54. Williamson, supra note 2, at 292.
55. Areeda & Turner, supra note I, at 1348.
56. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 51, at 72.
57. Professor Weiss recently characterized IBM as a "dominant firm" upon reviewing
evidence showing that its market share was in the 60% range. Weiss, The Structure-
Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust (forthcoming 127 U. PA. L. RLv. (1979)).
58. See F. SCHERER, supra note 50, at 125, 216-34, for a general discussion.
59. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 32, 409.
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dominant established firms." 0 This is precisely the situation that con-
cerns me.
E. Cost-based Rules
Virtually everyone who has commented on cost-based rules acknowledges
that cost estimation poses very serious difficulties. 61 Disputes over which
definition of costs is correct-including the appropriate time horizon, the
proper method of prorating common costs, and the rate at which fixed
costs become variable-predictably arise and occasion protracted litigation
in close cases. Realizing that average variable cost is a poor surrogate for
marginal cost at outputs that exceed capacity, Areeda and Turner now
argue that "a defendant monopolist be allowed to rely on A VC only when
he offers some evidence indicating that A VC is not significantly below
SRMC." 62 What qualifies as "some" is surely a matter of great dispute.
Since they also argue that "SRMC rises steeply as output nears that at
which short-run AC is minimized,"0' 3 so that SRMC and AVC diverge
sharply thereafter, it must be concluded, on their assumptions, that AVC
only rarely serves as a useful surrogate for SRMC.
My cost-based tests are not subject to this SRMC-AVC schizophrenia and
accordingly are more straightforward. Bork nevertheless contends that "true
average variable costs cannot be reconstructed adequately from business
records in a firm of any complexity. '6 4 Except in close cases, in which the
standards of adequacy are more severe, I am more sanguine than this. At
the same time, I agree that the administration problems of cost-based tests
are formidable. Accordingly, even if the Areeda-Turner approach to preda-
tory pricing were free of the analytical defects that beset it, the rules of law
which they propose might be rejected because of administrative difficulties.
The problems, moreover, do not stop with defining costs. Cost-based
tests involve a comparison of Price in relation to cost. Areeda and Turner
address none of the problems associated with determining price, possibly
because they regard it as a scalar which can be determined by simple in-
spection of invoices, when it is in fact a vector. If other terms of exchange
are changing, pecuniary price may be an imperfect measure of effective
price. Thus, if quality, service, credit, delivery, or allowances are changing,
the relevant price 5 for judging predatory pricing ought to reflect these
conditions. 6 6
60. Id. 409g.
61. See R. BORK, supra note 8, at 154; Williamson, supra note 2, at 312 nn.70-72.
62. Areeda &c Turner, supra note 1, at 1338.
63. Id. at 1345.
64. R. BORK, sutora note 8, at 154.
65. Professor Posner makes a similar observation about the multidimensionality of
supply. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 60 (1976). Conceivably Areeda and Turner intend
that price adjustments of these kinds will be captured instead by their measure of average
variable cost. If so, the need to make cost adjustments with respect to these dimensions
ought to be expressly acknowledged.
66. To be sure, the definition of quantity is also clouded if quality is changing. But
quantity measures do not necessarily need to be corrected for changing service, credit,
delivery, allowances, and other terms of supply, whereas effective price needs to be cor-
rected for each.
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There may be additional problems in defining price. Suppose that the
dominant firm is selling frozen pies and frozen cakes, that an entrant
appears offering frozen pies, and that the dominant firm responds by
cutting prices locally on both pies and cakes with the understanding that
buyers will purchase both in the accustomed ratio. The effective price cut
in these circumstances presumably ought to be concentrated entirely on the
product where the new competition has appeared.
Opportunities to resort to such tactics may not arise frequently and,
when they do, tied sales, or similar constraints, may be too transparent a
dodge to worry about. When, however, constrained multiproduct sales re-
sponses are observed to occur in reaction to single product entry, problems
of ascertaining whether the relevant price has been reduced below cost or
whether output has been increased disproportionately are both complicated.
V. Additional Considerations
A. Fairness
As I noted in my preliminary response to Areeda and Turner, 67 nowhere
in their comment-or for that matter in their original article-do they
examine predatory pricing rules from the standpoint of fairness. For those
who, like myself, believe that fairness is among the values that antitrust law
is designed to foster, explicit consideration of this issue is warranted.
Cost-based rules expressly allow dominant firms to supply output on a
contingent basis that is specifically targeted at localities where entry has
appeared. As I have argued previously,68 such contingent supply-"now it's
there, now it isn't, depending on whether an entrant has appeared or
perished-has the earmarks of a punitive purpose."0 9
By contrast, my output rule draws the line between permissible and im-
permissible behavior on terms that appeal to a sense of fairness. Consider
the following three questions, which exhaust the range of output responses:
Is it fair to require the dominant firm to make room for a new entrant by
withdrawing product when the entrant appears? Is it fair to subject the
new entrant to disproportionate output increases in target localities when
entry occurs? Is it fair that the dominant firm should be permitted to con-
tinue business as usual when entry occurs, in which event the new entrant
must expect to make a place for itself?
My answer to the first is that such a requirement would be protectionist.
Absent special justification, such a rule unfairly penalizes established firms.
The contingent supply of additional product in reaction to entry is the
punitive purpose to which I referred above. This puts entrants to an unfair
disadvantage. The dividing line between these protectionist and punitive
purposes is uniquely satisfied by a business as usual rule that permits
established firms to continue to produce and sell at their accustomed level
of activity.
67. Williamson, A Preliminary Response, 87 YALE L.J. 1353 (1978).
68. See Williamson, supra note 2, at 338-39.
69. Id. at 339.
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B. Product Differentiation
Predatory pricing issues are complicated when product differentiation is
introduced. For one thing, it may be useful and even necessary to distinguish
between main markets and fringe markets-by fringe markets I mean those
that are remote from the main market either geographically or in product
characteristics-in assessing dominance. Conventional market share measures
may either understate or overstate the effective main market position of
the dominant firm under these circumstances, depending on the distribu-
tion of its participation in main market and fringe market activities. Also,
rivalry is multidimensional and may be relatively undisciplined in dif-
ferentiated product industries. To the degree that nominal dominance does
not for this reason carry the same leadership or disciplinary potential, the
strategic incentives to police markets are attenuated and the hazards of
predation are correspondingly reduced.
In any event, the key question remains whether the dominant firm
responds contingently by increasing output disproportionately when entry
occurs. Responses that involve offering a new variant rather than increasing
the sales of the existing product would, of course, need to be "weighted"
appropriately. Except, however, in close cases, the choice of weights may not
be critical.
C. Decision-Theoretic Issues
My approach to predatory pricing emphasizes the strategic aspects and
assesses the properties of alternative rules in ex ante and ex post welfare
respects. Although I address some of the enforcement issues, I do not
examine the probabilities that mistaken judgments will be made or the
costs associated with such errors. A more comprehensive treatment would
take these features into account. I understand that work of this kind is in
progress."
Conceivably, rules will need to be matched with market characteristics
in a more discriminating way than I have attempted. I would be surprised,
however, if such an approach disclosed that a marginal cost pricing rule
has optimal properties in any market situation in which predatory pricing
poses interesting public policy issues. I would also be surprised if, once
allowance is made for the strategic uses to which predatory pricing may be
put, Professor Bork's conclusion on the irrelevance of predatory price
cutting stands up.7 '
Among the issues that require attention are the difficulties already dis-
cussed 72 concerning policy toward predatory pricing in the setting of
oligopoly. If efforts to curtail predatory price cutting in oligopolistic cir-
cumstances serve to promote greater interdependence or if some rules are
70. I have benefited from discussions with Paul Joskow and Alvin Klevorick on
decision-theoretic aspects of predatory pricing. They advise me that they have a paper in
progress in which these matters are developed.
71. Professor Bork reached this conclusion on the basis of a nonstrategic analysis of
the issues. R. BORK, supra note 8, at 155.
72. See pp. 1194-95 supra.
1198
Vol. 88: 1183, 1979
Predatory Pricing
more apt to promote interdependence than others, such effects ought to be
taken into account.
Moreover, there are interaction effects between the law governing preda-
tory pricing and the relative frequency of particular types of punitive be-
havior. Thus to show, as Koller does, that predatory price cutting con-
victions are uncommon7 a says little about the incidence of, or proclivity to
engage in, predatory pricing. Because Koller's sample was restricted to cases
that were brought to court, there is an understatement bias from the outset.
In addition, that predatory price cutting is uncommon when it is unlawful
does not establish that it will be equally uncommon if it is made lawful.
Finally, unless predatory pricing is addressed in strategic terms, the stan-
dards for judging predatory behavior may be too permissive, as the analysis
of the Areeda-Turner rules demonstrates.
Conclusion
The original Areeda-Turner article performed two distinct services. First,
it flagged in a more prominent way than had been done previously the
potential for abuse that predatory pricing cases-especially private preda-
tory pricing actions-posed. Lacking standards, the risk that protectionist
predatory pricing claims will succeed under an unstructured "all factors"
analysis is great. Second, Areeda and Turner demonstrated that the issues
could be systematically addressed using the tools of conventional economic
analysis.
These are important contributions. That their proposed rules of law
have defective economic properties and pose administrative problems does
not detract from this. As with many important contributions that serve
to open up an area for renewed scrutiny, subsequent refinements are often
possible and sometimes needed. Areeda and Turner's preoccupation with
protectionist abuses of predatory pricing amounts to overkill: while devising
rules which assuredly stamp such abuses out, the strategic incentives that
their cost-based rules introduce are ignored.
Scherer was quick to recognize this and identified a number of de-
ficiencies in the Areeda-Turner analysis. 74 He developed his argument in
somewhat nonstandard terms, however, which may have limited its im-
pact. The main force of his argument, in which intertemporal efficiency
and strategic considerations are prominent, was further obscured by his
suggestion that a complex judicial inquiry be used in place of Areeda and
Turner's cost-based tests. As a consequence, Bork dismissed Scherer's
"theoretical points ... because they lead him to an unworkable proposal."75
Areeda and Turner score heavily in their reply to Scherer by emphasizing
the unworkable aspects of his proposal.7 0 My analysis is more standard and
73. Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical Stitdy, 4 ANTITRUST L. &=
ECON. REv., Summer 1971, at 105.
74. See Scherer, supra note 15.
75. R. BORK, suPra note 8, at 155.
76. For Scherer's views on the all factors approach, see Scherer, supra note 15, at 890.
For the Areeda-Turner rebuttal, see Areeda & Turner, suPra note 32, at 897. My views
are expressed in Williamson, supra note 2, at 288 n.16.
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my proposal is much more workable. The spirit of Scherer's approach
and that of mine, however, are very similar.7 7
Evidently Areeda and Turner remain unpersuaded that strategic abuses
of predatory pricing rules pose a public policy problem. Having dealt with
one side of the issue, they insist that other aspects be ignored. By contrast,
I contend that two-sided issues require two-sided analysis. The output rule
that I propose expressly makes allowance for strategic aspects and has ef-
ficiency properties that are superior to their rule.78 Since it is also superior
in fairness respects and is easier to administer, I repeat my suggestion that
my rule be used instead. I do not, however, regard my work as the last word
in this area and anticipate that special cases may require additional atten-
tion. Refinements that sharpen the applicability of the "business as usual"
rule may well result. Some qualifications may also be necessary. But I pre-
dict with confidence that the strategic aspects that Areeda and Turner
suppress will continue to be prominently featured in subsequent studies.7 9
77. Scherer summarizes the objectives of predatory pricing law as follows:
The most workable competition in a [dominant firm industry] occurs when the
dominant firm fears that it cannot deter entry from a high-price posture and is there-
fore led toward a continuing low-price, high-output strategy, recognizing inter alia
that no rules will force it to make room if entry does occur.
Scherer, Some Last Words on Predatmy Pricing, 89 HARV. L. REV. 901, 902 (1976). I sub-
mit that these objectives are precisely those that are realized under the output restraining
rule that I propose.
78. I should acknowledge that since Areeda and Turner's rules have not yet been
fully adopted by the courts, strategic prepositioning with the full set of adverse efficiency
consequences that I associate with it will not presently materialize. This, however, is a
transitory feature; should their rules gain judicial legitimacy, prepositioning responses
will predictably appear. It would only be a matter of time until the inefficiency con-
sequences of their rules fully set in. In the meantime, moreover, legitimate plaintiffs
would frequently be unable to secure relief because of the onerous burden of having to
show that price (correctly defined) was reduced below marginal cost (correctly defined).
Even in the short run, therefore, the Areeda-Turner rules have little to recommend
them-a fortiori over time.
79. See note 16 supra (collecting authorities).
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